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SOCIAL AGENCY AND SYMBOLIC STRUCTURE.  
THE CASE OF SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE IN POLAND
Abstract
Changes in Poland, being a  result of transformation of economic system open the necessity of 
formation new social policy and new social assistance system, including professional social work. 
Professional character of social workers job is being constructed not only by law or institutional 
regulations, but through everyday activities undertaken by social workers. One of the consequenc-
es of these practices is the strategy of informal evaluation and classification of welfare clients. 
To understand the social workers daily professional practice is important to identify strategies, 
arguments and language codes lying behind them. We try to interpret this kind of social workers’ 
activity refer to different theoretical perspectives.
Key words: social work, social agency, reflexivity, apparent action
The point of departure – rapid changes, nascent globalization and 
social theory
Globalization gradually changing the social environment of the functioning of the classic 
sociology. What is fundamental here is the problematisation of the so far obvious notion 
of “society”, traditionally rooted in the idea of the nation-state. Globalization change the 
role of the nation-state and the position of the concept of society in sociological theory. 
The notion loses its explanatory power. The key question is concerned with redefinition of 
the meaning of the social. (Dean 1997; Freitag 2002; Touraine 1998; Urry 2000). It open 
once again the well-known question concerning the problem of the social order, that is 
the relationship between individual instrumental activity and the base of the persistence 
of overindividual social wholes. Aside from the manner of the interpretation of the bases 
of this relationship – instrumental action or social structure – in reality, this relationship, 
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not its elements, was an object of the reflection of classical sociology (Ritzer 1990). How-
ever in different periods dominated an “extremist” sociological interpretations concen-
trating their own interest, first of all, on one side of action-structure relationship, leading 
to theoretically limited “two sociologies” (Dawe 1970). Beginning from the eighties we 
observe in sociological theory a strongly foreshadowed tendency to building bridges be-
tween micro and macro sociological perspectives. Synthetic tendencies are presented both 
in American and European sociology. There is shaped „the new theoretical movement” 
(Alexander 1988) bridging the action – structure boundaries. It is a theoretical as well as 
empirical problem. The present text and project in general is in greater depth rooted in 
action-structure theoretical reflection and its empirical verification. The main object of 
research interests are social workers symbolical practices, particularly strategies, arguments 
and language codes using by them in relations with social welfare clients.
The field of Polish social work
Changes in Poland, being a result of transformation of economic system, and Polish aspira-
tions to become a member of European Union, open the necessity of formation new social 
policy and new social assistance system. System adapting European standards and answering 
social problems did not meet earlier in this scale (unemployment). One of defined target of 
new social policy and social assistance system, is to help people and families becoming more 
independent oneself and more integrate with social environment. Basic way of supporting 
of persons and families should be, restored in Polish reality, social work. The majority of 
social assistance services including various categories of cash benefits as well as different 
forms of non-financial support, are provided by social assistance centres and powiat centres 
for family support. Among the non-financial forms of support, the main role played social 
work. The most important social actors in the welfare system are social workers. Naturally 
identifying social workers as main welfare actors is a part of much broader discussion not 
only on welfare system, but on power relations and social justice as well. 
Polish welfare system is regulated by Social Assistance Act of 12 March 2004. The 
system are basing on western model and a kind of “welfare culture”, that is, institutional 
relations, as well as profesional practice. One of the most important issue was and still 
is a problem of profesionalisation of social workers in Poland (Granosik 2006). In con-
text of the “welfare culture” social workers have to perform activities, which require 
knowledge, skills and responsibility. Professional social work as a part of welfare culture 
include professional identity, which is a result of social workers intergroup contacts, let 
them defining themselves by belonging to this profesional group. Identity with that group 
determinates essential condition of participation in the group activity and loyalty. Cre-
ate professional boundaries between what is acceptable and unacceptable. Professio nal 
identity of social workers are influenced by education to social work – professional skills 
and competences – and institutional conditions – norms, principles, formal rules, in-
stitutional framework, legal aspects, social control etc. 
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But the problem is, that professional character of social workers job is being con-
structed not only by law or institutional regulations, but through everyday activities 
undertaken by social workers too. Social work is a reflective activity and social worker 
is a reflective practitioner (Howe 2009). “Social work does not impose a set of prescrip-
tions on clients. Instead, it reacts to clients and the world in which they live, and it does 
so through reflection” (Payne 2002: 127–128). To understand the social workers daily 
profesional practice is important not only to take into consideration the formal and 
institutional environments, but also identify strategies, arguments and language codes 
lying behind them.
‘Apparent action’ as an effect
Scarce public resources, material as well as symbolic, and structural arrangements of 
organizations inherited partly from the ancient regime of state socialism doesn’t allow 
the realization of procedures imposed from the centre of global capitalism. To these 
difficulties should be added the social workers’ inferior position in the whole network 
of public administration. First and foremost it means limited range of power and deep 
dependence on local government authorities. Another and no less important factor is 
the unfavorable economic condition of social workers and, connected with this, the 
low prestige of the profession. 
Social workers, trying to cope with these contradictions and the discrepancy be-
tween imposed requirements and limited structural properties express highly reflexive 
behavior. In effect, as plenty of research shows (Trawkowska 2007) they conform to 
outside necessities, that is administration procedures, only superficially, without proper 
realization of general organizational aims. In Polish sociological literature such a solu-
tion is called “apparent action” (Lutyński 1977). Apparent action is officially perceived 
as important for the realization of certain social aims but, in fact, it cannot be realized. 
However, in a given organization almost everybody knows about the fictional character 
of this action and, paradoxically, this knowledge isn’t officially recognized. This kind of 
action was a common way to deal with the contradictions in state socialist organizations. 
Constant shortage of various resources and outside administrative pressure found its 
effect in “apparent action”. Today in spite of the system transition, “apparent action” is 
still conducted, usually (but it is not certain) in the field of public services. 
Two important things should be emphasized. First, apparent action is apparent only 
in organizational terms, that is, from the point of view of a certain organization and its 
requirements. Sociologically, apparent action is not non-action but action per se thus 
extremely important in the context of this analysis. According to our findings, such 
a practice is preceded by reflexive deliberation so we can call it “project” (in Archer’s 
meaning). Second, apparent action, at least in the field of Polish social work, is a result 
of the collective effort. Three years of personal experience of one of us in a social service 
organization shows that every difficult situation resulting from incompatibility between 
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procedures and available resources is usually resolved in an informal way by the whole 
group of social workers who work together.
One of the consequences of these practices is the strategy of informal evaluation 
and classification of welfare clients. If material resources, that is welfare benefits for 
clients, are strictly limited, social workers need special forms of categorization, a kind 
of social hierarchy of the clients, or, to put it in another way, a distinction which divides 
the clients into “deserving and undeserving poor”. However, aside from this utilitarian 
need, purely symbolic procedure also matters. Social workers’ ill-defined professional 
identity, their uncertain status in changing and overlapping social structures need to 
be strengthen by drawing a clear symbolic boundary between them and welfare clients. 
Thus the part of social workers’ efforts in the building of classification systems of the 
clients is devoted to this. We should remember that very often individuals from these 
two groups are near to each other in the social space. This is a clear result of Polish so-
cial workers’ inferior economic position. 
Regarding our personal experience and, partly, existing research which concerns Polish 
social workers we can assume that this meaning-making work to assign classifications 
is done in a manner called by Erving Goffman and Randall Collins “interaction rituals”. 
Social workers conduct the rituals, in which classification systems are made, during 
their everyday work activity. Symbolic forms and social categorizations are established 
through informal conversations and discussions about concrete clients, hence, in this 
way, the hierarchy of welfare clients appears. Using Collins’ theory (2004) it is possible 
to say that thanks to these interaction rituals social workers single out particularly bad 
clients (the lazy, the trouble-makers) who become “negative sacred objects” and, con-
sequently, markers of norms, the personifications of border lines which determine the 
world of decent and indecent people.
Interaction rituals, realized in social workers’ workplaces, take the form of negotia-
tions. The social circumstances mentioned above mean that these processes are made 
with higher reflexivity. The problem is that Collins’ theory of interaction rituals presents 
ambivalence in this respect.
On the one hand Collins (2004) acknowledges the process of an internal conversa-
tion (therefore some kind of reflexivity), on the other hand he maintains that agency 
is a question of emotional energy and symbols, not deliberation. (embodied cultural 
capital is like a social gyroscope that navigates to given interactions) thus this problem 
highlights theoretical questions and dilemmas that should be considered.
Dilemmas and questions
the problem of classification
The problem of social classifications has already appeared in classical sociological 
analysis. In this respect Emil Durkeim’s and Marcell Mauss’ work (1963), Primitive 
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Form of Classification, has a special meaning because it was the first serious attempt 
to combine symbolic forms with social structure (using contemporary language). In 
another of Durkheim’s books, Elementary Forms of Religious Life (2001), this idea was 
further elaborated and then became the basis for other prominent analyses, such as, 
to single out only two, Mary Doulglas’ Purity and Danger or David Bloor’s Knowledge 
and Social Imagery.
Among plenty of neo-Durkheimian works, Bourdieu’s theory deserves special at-
tention. Of course Bourdieu, developing his approach, drew on various sociological 
traditions – Weberian, Marxists etc. – but a Durkheimien trace is quite clear there 
(Wacquant 1995) and this line of thinking is very useful for our analysis. A perfect ex-
ample of this is research devoted to “academic forms of classification” in which Bourdieu 
(1989) showed that professors’ classification of students’ work is connected with the 
social origins of the students. Such classifications are unconscious, and remain part of 
professors’ habitus. The important thing is that, according to Bourdieu, classifications 
and principles of “vision and division” are embodied and consequently, inaccessible for 
reflexive deliberation. 
Margaret Archer (2007) sees in Bourdieu’s theory a fundamental error called “the 
fallacy of conflation” – the elusion of agency and structure that “prevents the interplay 
between ‘parts’ and ‘people’ from being the foundation of cultural dynamics” (Archer 
1988: xiii). In this paper we don’t want to settle the general problem of human agency 
(whether it is reflexive or not) but consider only this specific peripheral context of sym-
bolic action and hypothetically determine possible solutions. Therefore Archer as well 
as other sociologists declare that an unreflexive form of action presented by Bourdieu 
is impossible because of special social circumstances which actors have to deal with 
today. As we mentioned above, nascent globalization and, connected with it, contextual 
discontinuity, force reflexivity thus Bourdieu’s vision of agency should be corrected. 
Bourdieu admits of reflexivity, a deliberative choice of the action line, only in the 
particular situation of crisis: “Times of crises, in which the routine adjustment of sub-
jective and objective structures is brutally disrupted, constitute a class of circumstances 
when indeed ‘rational choice’ often appears to take over” (Wacquant 1989: 44). Other 
researchers, basing their opinions on the fact that contemporary late modernity is full 
of crises and the inevitable disruption of subjective and objective structures, introduced 
corrections to Bourdieu’s model. In this respect Paul Sweetman proposed the new term, 
‘reflexive habitus’ which express a property characteristic of changing conditions of cur-
rent everyday life – habitual reflexivity. A similar line of argumentation can be found 
Matthew Adams’ work (2006). Some authors, like Lash and Urry (1994), underline 
strongly that experiences of reflexivity vary across the social structure and, as an effect, 
the social world of late modernity is increasingly divided into groups of ‘reflexivity win-
ners’ and ‘reflexivity losers’
It seems to be that Polish social workers, forced to cope with the incongruency of 
their own subjective schemata and objective changing structure, could express habitual 
reflexivity in their professional activity. Nevertheless such a proposal is questionable. 
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Archer rightly criticizes this perspective as internally contradictory, and suggests 
abandoning the concept of habitus as useless in our highly reflexive world – “in fact, 
given how ‘habitus’ stressed the pre-adaptation of people to circumstances and the 
‘semi-conscious’, ‘quasi-automatic’ nature of its operations (…) it is hard to think of any 
concept less helpful for dealing with conscious deliberations and the determination of 
choices.” (Archer 2007: 56)
However, Archer goes further in criticizing Bourdieu – 
since the habitus is always held to be the embodiment of a strong practical sense, giving a feel for 
the game, one can seriously question whether today’s novel global games can be played by virtue of 
embodied practical mastery. In other words, new games with such names as ‘external investment’, 
‘labour mobility’, ‘foreign exchange dealing’, ‘multi-lingualism’ or ‘permanent software upgrading’ 
need to be mastered by an intensively discursive and deliberative approach, one exceeding the pos-
sibilities of embodied skills – how can stock exchange trading or computer programming be em-
bodied? (Archer 2007: 56).
With regard to Bourdieu’s vision of action and a social actor’s ontological status Luc 
Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1991) (Bourdieu’s former collaborators), went in 
a similar direction. They deny the perspective according to which an agent is deeply 
involved in social forces and unconscious of structures that exert pressure on his mind 
and body. Actually, Boltanski and Thévenot abandon the very principle of symbolic 
violence and give actors not only relatively free space for subjective action but, which 
is more important, admit actors’ strong critical capacity. Such a “sociology of critique” 
which allegedly replaces Bourdieu’s critical sociology doesn’t present actors as the vic-
tims of illusion but agents who on the one hand can relate to the outside world with 
a critical view and on the other hand, which should be emphasized, can justify their 
action. Critical thinking and justification are activated especially in moments of crises 
when “something is going wrong” (Boltanski, Thévenot 1999). In this process individuals 
are able to recognize an unjust state of affairs and through dispute with others express 
their point of view, based on certain justifications. Social actors constantly use the basic 
grammar of modes of justification, identified by Boltanski and Thévenot as “orders of 
worth” (cites). Despite the fact that every social context has its own order and possible 
principles of justification which can be used within it the number of them are limited. 
Boltanski and Thévenot identified six cites. 
Again we can refer this perspective to social workers’ activity in uncertain situations, 
that are, as we have argued, almost everyday conditions for them today. When they clas-
sify welfare clients they have to, like every individual in a similar situation, find a proper 
form of justification. Whether they use modes outlined by Boltanski and Thévenot or 
try to find other spheres of values is less important. The point is a sociological way of 
agency – how great a range of freedom in using various forms of justification do they 
have? Some commentators convince us that Boltanski and Thévenot present a kind of 
voluntarism (Wuggenig 2008) – social actors are virtually free in their action, they are 
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constrained only by a “principle of equivalence” (the number of them is limited) as the 
basis of certain disputes but not by social structures. 
Recognition of social actors’ critical capacities, especially in a moment of crisis, has 
great value. But the whole ontological status of the actor, presented by Boltanski and 
Thévenot is difficult to accept. Michele Lamont, a Canadian sociologist who worked 
first with Bourdieu and then with Thévenot has introduced important nuances which 
corrected both perspectives. 
Lamont developed the theory of symbolic boundaries, defined in the following way: 
“symbolic boundaries are the lines that define some people, groups, and things while 
exclude others. These distinction can be expressed through normative interdictions 
(taboos), cultural identities, attitudes and practices, and more generally through pat-
terns of likes and dislikes” (Lamont 2009: 172).
Lamont doesn’t accept Bourdieu’s habitus, capital and field, considering them con-
cepts presenting a too rigid vision of social life. Symbolic boundaries are characterized 
by various levels of strength, some of them co-create social hierarchies but others do 
not – the latter remain signals of differences. Furthermore Lamont depicted a much more 
dynamic vision of contemporary societies with overlapping and continuously changing 
systems of semiotic codes (Lamont 1992). Agents can use limited sets of available cul-
tural repertoire (symbolic boundaries or criteria of evaluation aren’t equally available 
for all) but this usage changes along with structural conditions. It may feature in social 
classes but in whole nations too. In her other book, devoted to evaluation of academic 
works, Lamont underlines other factors, like for instance the self-concept of evaluators. 
Thus Lamont found a middle way between voluntarism and determinism and, contrary 
to Bourdieu, makes “room for the relative autonomy of symbolic boundaries from struc-
tural conditions”, emphasizing “the possibility for individuals to actively choose among 
cultural resources, even if their choices are largely channeled by ‘cultural supply side’ of 
the equation” (Lamont 1992: 135).
Both Lamont and Boltanski and Thévenot downplay the question of bodily practice. 
As we know it was a highly important problem for Bourdieu, which contributed to un-
derstanding the general problem of human agency – mental schemata are embodied 
and thanks to this an agent, without reflexive deliberation, can “feel the game”. Nascent 
globalization and rapid changes question such a perspective.
Bodily schemata and reflexivity
The corporal aspect of agency evokes an important question of the level (or levels) of 
reflexivity. Is deliberation and reflection really ubiquitous and bodily schemata estab-
lished through socialization doesn’t matter any longer? Archer argues that ‘the new 
cosmopolitans’, individuals with various social background who experience global 
mobility are highly reflexive and socialization doesn’t play an important role in their 
course of action. In our opinion such an assessment is exaggerated. Regardless of the 
increasing reflexivity of everyday life, which is an indisputable fact, some elements of 
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socialization, especially embodied cultural capital, still matter. It is difficult to question 
the fundamental problem of language, an element which leads to a success or failure 
in school. In this context some parts of language can be treated as an object of actors’ 
reflection (the distinction subject/object is the condition of reflexivity) but others parts 
remain unconscious. 
Our first investigations confirms this strictly corporal, probably semi-conscious ele-
ment of social practice. When social workers describe welfare clients and, consciously 
or not, try to assess them, they very often use sensual language. Usually moral catego-
ries, especially those that define negative behavior, are presented in odour classification 
(“I don’t like to work with her, she is unemployed but she can’t even clean her house that 
still stinks”), which clearly evokes bodily deposited dispositions. 
Moreover, some researchers observed that even in areas of highly developed financial 
operations which, as Archer rightly said, invoke a need of profound reflexivity, bodily 
practices still matter (Widick 2004).
So how to find a middle way between reflexivity of action and embodied, semi-
conscious practices? Theoretical assumptions and empirical evidences indicate that we 
should recognize reflexivity, clearly visible in the rapid changes on the periphery, and, 
at the same time, not neglect the corporal, unconscious level of agency. 
Maybe we need to return to the old theme of deep and superficial structures, devel-
oped in the area of structuralism, which has been recalled by William H. Sewell (1992) 
in his considerations about agency and structure. How profound deep structures are 
and what the difference is between them and structures more “surface” should be the 
object of further investigations. For sure we cannot fully assume this strictly intellectual 
point of view, embodied in intellectuals’ dispositions which perceives the social world 
as a matter of common reflexivity (Bourdieu 1994) but simultaneously we shouldn’t be 
blind to the clear fact, that changes which occur these days lead to the rupture of smooth 
reproduction of social structures and, which is connected with it, semi-conscious agency.
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